Regardless of all this beauty, as raiders, these eight large ships were a complete flop. Considering their power, armament, crews and cost, the few ships they sunk or took as prizes were a very poor return. Bismarck and Prinz Eugen did nothing against goods traffic. Deutschland and Admiral Hipper did very little. The other four got some better results but nothing outstanding and nothing unachievable by a tiny Type-VII U-Boat. But they weren't the only German surface raiders of WWII. There were another nine warships that totalled, among all of them, sunk or captured 142 ships (more than 870.000 tons of standard gross weight), in a total of 3.769 days at sea (an average of more than 230 tons of enemy ships sunk or captured per day). If this war record is impressive then the economical figures are even more. This performance was achieved by a little more than 3.000 sailors, and by nine second hand ships built as freighters, armed with third hand old weapons and whose total cost of ownership and fitting out didn't reach 1% of Bismarck.

They were built as freighters but they sailed and fought as true warships. They were manned by soldiers and lead by soldiers, by commanders or captains no less capable than the ones that commanded Gneisenau or Admiral Scheer. Freighters they were indeed and some of them returned to be freighters after fighting. But at sea they were real warships, real fighters. Real men of war, some of them even among the most gallant of all times, of all the sea wars.

Given all of this, why are they so unknown, so obscured, so forgotten?

Probably, because they weren't glamorous. They were unglamorous, ugly and dirty German or Polish freighters disguised as unglamorous, ugly and dirty non-German freighters. Nothing is beautiful in their rare photographs. Their silhouettes have nothing to do with the delicate, well balanced but also aggressive, built-to-fight lines of Gneisenau or Tirpitz. Their colours couldn't match the ones of Admiral Hipper or Prinz Eugen. Their overall aspect can't be compared with the ones of Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Deutschland or Admiral Graf Spee. They were all but wonderful. Just as was desired for them: to be vulgar, ugly, and dirty, practically stealthy.

Perhaps that's the reason that they are so fascinating.

They had the old pure fascination of blue-blooded high sea corsairs.

Etappendienst was the key for traffic war, both through regular units and auxiliary ones, for the blockade runners that brought strategic goods to Germany from Japan and other countries and for U-Boat replenishment at sea of fuel, water, food, spares and torpedoes. For the auxiliary cruisers it was even more essential than for others because the warships never were at sea so many months and their replenishment necessities were less while the auxiliary cruisers sailed regularly for more than a year.

The "Hilfskreuzer" (HK) concept was not entirely supported by the Kriegsmarines high command. Some months before the war many high staff officers showed their lack of confidence in this strategy. The sea was "much smaller" in WWII than in WWI. There was better communication systems, there was long range surveillance aircraft, and there were no German colonies. The entire force of HK's would rely on non-tested, non-warranted supply systems. To reach open sea from Germany in front of the formidable vigilant lines of UK and France was judged as impossible. Behind all this a very important point: at the time, the Kriegsmarine strategic thinking (surface war) was all but audacious. Kriegsmarine high ranking "old style" officers were fiercely overcautious. . The Nazi principles of blind obedience and to always follow the leader (der Führer, a leader that "never was wrong"), and a single minded way of thinking (the typical of any standard dictatorial system), deeply contaminated the Kriegsmarine. Traditional Prussian war principles (independency of the field/sea commander, open strategy, general directives and proprietary development of the officers' capacity of thinking by themselves and to judge in the field, in front of the enemy) were not very well appreciated. The final compromise between the professionals old style thinkers and the Nazi-influenced admirals and high ranking officers were as follows: Hilfskreuzern, yes, but not as a top priority; not fifty, only five and later some more depending on performance; only general service freighters, and not precisely the good ones; armament, almost for scrap (the 5-9" secondary batteries of the old pre-dreadnought battleship force, 40 or more years old at the time); crews, volunteers not requested by other ships; officers, almost all from the reserve force; commanders, not precisely considered as the most brilliant. In other words, the ones not valid for the pretty, very expensive regular units. On top of that, full secrecy. Total Gekados ("GeKaDoS" means GEheime KommAnDOSache)); it was used by the OKW (head command) to classify top secrets. The more or less unavoidable loss or the five initial HK's must never affect the German people's faith and moral of victory.

Apart from this the strategy was simple. To stay at sea the maximum time possible, to disturb the sea lanes as much as they could, to avoid any possible fight with equivalent enemy units (AMC's or Armed Merchant Cruisers, the British concept of auxiliary cruisers; very different of the German ones) and to try, while possible, to send the prized ships to Germany, when the goods justified the risk. For this reason the HK's would carry a rather large "prize crew" to man the captured ships. Some of the HK's were finally armed with magnetic mines to act as minelayers in the vicinity of ports that under normal conditions never would consider themselves a part of the war (the South-African, Australian and New Zealand ones).

At the beginning of the campaign, when the first wave of HK's (Orion, Atlantis, Widder, Thor and Pinguin) departed from German ports (between April and June 1940), very few Kriegsmarine officers (not too many aware of their existence) would bet any money on their possibilities to stay afloat for more than a week. Only the old style officers, still Prussians, had confidence. A proof of it was a rather surprising right given to the HK commanders to Christianize their ships. This in the most pure corsair tradition.

Sea experience soon showed that diesel machinery, for HK's, was a must. Orion and Widder, former twin sisters Kurmark and Neumark suffered from continued problems, lost many prizes that overran them and showed an almost unmanageable oil replenishment problem. Widder was even forced to cancel her actions seven months before her expected one year mission. This fiasco was one of the bitter consequences of the lack of vision (by the high command) at the time of ship-as-a-weapon strategic definition.

In second half of 1940 the "pro-HK's" party joined by Hitler because the amazing performance of the five ships. A good thing of dictators is that when they are in favour of something everything is in their in favour. Most of the former restrictions were lifted, and a second wave of six ships was quickly fitted out for sea. The first one, Komet, reached the Pacific border at the coast of Siberia in a demonstration of outstanding seamanship that gave her commander the first Rear Admiral flag of all the HK's. Three more, Stier, Kormoran and Michel, were able to reach open sea. The last two, Coronel (the former freighter Togo) and Hansa (the former Danish freighter Glengarry), the best fitted out for the task, were never able to break through the lines of the ever vigilant British.

Komet was a tiny diesel freighter incapable of laying mines. Stier and Michel were slightly bigger diesel freighters, big enough to carry an E-Boat. Kormoran was the biggest of all the nine Hilfskreuzers and also had diesel machinery. All of them, especially Michel (she was seized unfinished before launching, and rebuilt in according to war experience), had improved bulkheads, which gave them high buoyancy. They were, by far, superior to the first five, but when they reached open sea the conditions of war were much worse for the HK's than a year earlier. Despite of this their work was generally fairly successful.

All of the nine HK's carried the same main armament: six 150 mm (5-9"), 40 year old guns on single mountings, well camouflaged behind false partitions of the upper hull, two to six deck level torpedo tubes, two underwater torpedo tubes (only Kormoran), four to six 37 mm dual purpose guns and a 75 mm gun, sometimes disguised as a 105 mm gun as the one mounted on the stern on most British and American (from early 1942) freighters. All of them carried two Arado Ar196 seaplanes (one as reserve, dismounted) and several 20 mm and 7-92 mm AA automatic guns (Orion and Stier got at sea, each of them, a Nakajima 90-11). Finally, Stier and Michel carried a tiny Schnellboot (Enemy Boat as it was called by the Allied forces), capable of 40 knots to be used as an auxiliary (they carried two torpedoes) when a faster prey tried to outrun them.

This armament, in principle, could be compared to a HMS Arethusa class light cruiser, but apart from that there is no possible comparison. The six 6" of an Arethusa were able to fire broadside, while only two out of six of a HK could be trained at port and starboard. The secondary armament of an Arethusa was by far more powerful, the HK's were entirely unarmoured while the Arethusa's had reasonable protection, and, most important, Arethusa could do more than 33 knots, while Kormoran, the fastest of the nine HK's, hardly was able to do 18 knots.

The HK's, in short, were absolutely not equipped to face a light or heavy cruiser, and only scarcely capable of fighting an AMC, usually armed with eight 6" in single mountings. The HK's were not designed to engage in battle but one way or another some of them were forced to face AMC's, light cruisers and heavy cruisers. Furthermore, and despite how unbelievable it could seem to be, one of them and her commander did look for battle with AMC's or light cruisers.

If the prize didn't obey, just firing, looking for the radio operation station. Usually three or four broadsides were enough to convince any captain. From here, the same procedure.

At the beginning, German raiders kept all prisoners on board until the frightening disappearance of some ships in a specific sea area called the British attention. The usual procedure at this point was, after a ship was taken, crew were sent ashore (less captain and officers) in the prize boats, or they were transferred to an auxiliary prize ship. The raider commanders, in general, had no interest in sending crews or passengers to Germany as they would be less combat ready. They did this for security reasons trying to avoid information of there positions and appereance being made known.

Around late 1940 war conditions became harder. British Admiralty orders were more demanding: avoid any ship on sea and always use the radio, regardless of the cost. Very hard but necessary to allocate the raiders. Capturing techniques changed, in consequence. The Arado's became more and more useful. Not only for searching. When a prize was identified the sea plane flew over her, grabbing the radio wires with a trailing hook and later strafing her decks. In some cases it landed close to the ship and kept position in front of her, engine on and machine guns aimed at the prize (a display absolutely convincing in case of fully loaded tankers), waiting for the arrival of the corsair.

Even that became obsolete through 1941. Ships escaped at full speed, fixing quickly their radio facilities and sending warning messages. The German procedures changed again. Some of the raider's commanders stopped attacking by day and attacked by night. When they detected a potential prize they tried, first of all, to remain un-observed. Then they analysed bearing and speed of the prize to calculate a bearing and a speed that allowed them to get into an attack position at night. The best time was just before the moon appeared and coming from the darkest horizon. This tactic became very efficient. The prize, took by total surprise, usually didn't use the radio and surrendered quickly. It was more costly in terms of lives, but the hardening of war conditions made it almost un-avoidable.

The raider's commanders were not allowed to look for battle, but one of them, Helmuth von Ruckteschell (HK Michel), often tried as an exception. His tactic, very risky, was to attack an enemy ship at night, letting her use the radio, sink her then leave survivors floating in their boats. Afterwards, he would hide below the horizon. Some hours later, in day light, he appeared again, at full speed. Providing the previous attack was at night the survivors weren't able to identify the raider. The idea was to show the raider as a friendly ship, coming at full speed to help the shipwrecked, but really to attack at close quarters which ever ship at the time was helping them. The risk consisted in that the ship could be a non un-armed freighter. She could be an AMC, or even a light cruiser. The von Ruckteschell way of thinking was that nobody would suspect anything until it was too late when the hurried "friendly ship" rushed to the scene closing the distance to one thousand meters and then show the German combat flag, fire a full salvo of three torpedoes and fire entire broadsides at point blank. An interesting case but it never happened. The time von Ruckteschell was closest to success, the potential prize, HMS Alcantara (an AMC with some experience on Hilfskreuzern), had left the area less than one hour earlier.

Another tactic of Helmuth von Ruckteschell was to use a Schnellboot. The procedure was simple. If the prize were too fast to be caught during the night, the Schnellboot was sent. At the right time she fired one or two torpedoes and then awaited the arrival of the raider. For the prize the effect was the same as to have been torpedoed by a submarine. The fault with this tactic was prize ships could not be sent to Germany after being torpedoed. At that time of war return to Germany was almost impossible, even for the most experienced captains or blockade runners. This was the reason HK Michel never captured a prize ship. It only sank ships, regardless the ship value or her cargo value. Sometimes a painful loss of badly needed raw materials, but it was very convenient for the raider's safety.

The Hilfskreuzern usually operated alone and well separated from the others, not only to cover a major area, but also to avoid a mutual attack. There were only two exceptions: Komet and Orion, that operated jointly, in the Pacific, during three weeks in November-December 1940, with moderate success, and Michel and Stier, that did the same in the summer of 1942 (South Atlantic), with no results. There were more associations between HK's and blockade runners (as Stier together with Tannenfels) and prize ships converted to auxiliary ships (replenishment and prisoner housing) for one or more raiders, but nothing at the scale of Komet and Orion.

A good example of this was the Admiral Scheer campaign in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. She made use of some HK's during the operation. In one case even offering protection against the 8" shells of the British high seas scouting cruisers. The HK commander declined the offer, not only for operational reasons (basically the big difference in speed), but his concept of defence. The main defence device of Admiral Scheer was her main battery. The one of a corsair was her disguise.

A HK commander had to be a very special man. First of all, independent, and this for many, many months. No Group West or equivalent telling him what to do, or where to go. Secondly, resilient. Nobody to ask, nobody to consult. His word always was the last word. No fatigue, no depressions, no changes of humour, no illness, no fever, no human weaknesses. A HK commander was akin to God on his ship. Thirdly, reliable. Never asleep, never cowardly, never temerarious, always cold, sharp, worth of full of confidence. Never openly thinking on his home or his family. Never nostalgic, never to suffer from solitude or to lower himself to his officers. HK commanders were the model for all men on board. They had to be absolutely perfect, at least in front of others. Not the same as an ordinary warship commander at sea, remember: a HK was almost defenceless in front of any warship, unable to escape, and all of this for many, many months.

Ships company moral: the highest challenge of any HK commander. How to keep it high after months of no success, boring weeks and weeks of hunting, under very high temperatures or extremely heavy seas, not too good food, no alcohol, no entertainments apart from some movies, books and deck sports? A miracle, really. U-Boats crew’s lives were worse of course, but during only a few weeks, usually no more than ten, and always with the confidence of being able to fight or escape.

Eight out of the ten HK's commanders were really exceptional men (Ulrich Brocksien could demonstrate nothing because his ship was sunk after only six days at sea and Horst Gerlach was unlucky, sunk by a prize after only five months of raiding; Ernst Thienemann, the appointed captain of HK Coronel, probably would be another exceptional commander –he was the soul of the HK's, and the responsible of the fitting out of all of them-, but his ship were very badly handled by british bombers and destroyers at the British Channel, and never could make open sea). The eight of them were highly decorated. All eight received the Ritterkreuz (Knights Cross) and four also the Eichenlaubs (oak leaves; providing only 890 Eichenlaubs were awarded during the entire war, the HK's commanders, as a group, were the most decorated of all the Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and Waffen-SS forces). The four that returned to Germany at war time (except Gerlach) were promoted to Konteradmirals (Rear-Admirals), and one of them got the same rank some years later, under the Bundesmarine (Federal German Navy). All deserved full recognition for their war merits and exceptional performance, five of them really crossed the limits of what could be expected from a HK commander.

Bernhard Rogge (Atlantis; 04-11-1899 – 29-06-1982) stayed at sea more than any other: 601 days. His war record was comparable to the top performer (22 ships, almost 146.000 tons; approximately the same as the Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in Operation "Berlin", but being a tiny 7.900 tons freighter instead of two superb battleships, 32.000 tons each). Rogge, on top of his military abilities, and his prodigious instinct for survival, he was gentleman, truly appreciated by both his men and his prisoners. His ice cool nerve was legendary. Even during the low times he kept sharp. Instead of opening fire on HMS Devonshire, well out of his guns maximum range, he preferred to sink his ship not giving the British cruiser the opportunity of knowing he was a raider or a blockade runner. The consequence, to keep unchanged the very costly British surveillance display forces. At the end of WWII he was Vizeadmiral (Vice-Admiral). In 1955 he joined the newly formed Bundesmarine, with the rank of Konteradmiral (Rear-Admiral).

—

—

Otto Kähler (Thor first campaign, 03-03-1894 – 02-11-1967) was forced to engage in combat three times, always in front of British AMC's armed with 8x6" guns, all of them much bigger, stronger and faster than his tiny ex-banana freighter, Hilfskreuzer. The first one, HMS Alcantara, a 22.200 tons, 19 knots Atlantic runner. The combat was very violent. It finished when the British AMC, on fire, listing and almost sinking broke contact and ran into Rio de Janeiro, for badly needed repairs. The second one, HMS Caernarfon Castle, another 20.000 tons and 19 knots Atlantic runner. The combat took 75 minutes. The HK suffered no hits. The British ship, 26 150 mm (5-9") direct hits, six of them near the waterline, and finally broke contact, on fire and escaped to Montevideo at full speed. The third one, HMS Voltaire, 13.245 tons and 14,5 knots, didn't break contact, or escape. She was simply sunk after 80 minutes of hard combat. The HK suffered only one hit that broke the radio wires with no other effects. Three battles, three victories (even a ship sunk) and all of this with a ship specifically not designed to fight. Kähler's fighting abilities were widely recognized. Some times luck can justify a victory over a superior enemy, but three times in a row is not just luck. It was talent, and training. Otto Kähler became Konteradmiral (Rear-Admiral) and responsible of the Brest naval defences (he was POW in the United States), but during his entire life he always said that the high point in his career was the command of the HK Thor. On his grave is wrote "Otto Kähler, Kommandant von Hilfskreuzer Thor".

Helmuth von Ruckteschell (Widder and Michel's first campaign; 22-03-1890 – 24-09-1948) was a different type of guy. Older than the others, coming from the reserve status (captain), he commanded a U-Boat during WWI, succeeding in torpedoing and sinking a major British warship. In a certain way he was more a "corsair" (some people said "pirate") than the other HK commanders. He wasn't a friendly gentleman type like Rogge. It's said that he was very temperamental, even brutal, in most of his behaviour. He was always worried for his ships security, but not at standard levels. This was because the Widder was the worst, technically speaking, of all the raiders. Slower, oil thirsty and unreliable, she forced von Ruckteschell to return to Germany after only 178 days at sea (10 ships sunk or captured). With such a piece of junk von Ruckteschell hunting opportunities were very poor, because several possible prizes escaped from him thanks to their higher speeds, sending at the time warning messages and forcing the raider to leave the area. It forced him to develop tactics that later were considered "brutal". He always tried to attack at night and with no warning. He just shot and shot until the counterpart surrendered, indifferent to the prize casualties. To him, his ships security was the absolute priority. After leaving Widder he got the command of the last of all raiders (the last afloat), the Michel. She was much better than Widder (all the previous war experience was applied to her fitting out), but the sea war conditions of 1942 was much worst than the 1940 ones. A curious anecdot that in a certain way describes the 'strategy approach' of this true corsair: it is not well known that this name was not accepted by the Kriegsmarine. Too frivolous and a little "pro-Jew" (Archangel Saint Michel was a very important figure of the Old Testament). Given the commander's right to choose their ships' names, but knowing that to face nazi ambushed superior officers was not very healthy, he announced to his command a new one, "Götz von Berlinchingen", a famous warrior (and traitor) of the religious wars that killed hundreds of thousands of people. Regardless he was also a Goethe's character (not among the good ones), the Kriegsmarine finally (and reluctantly) accepted Michel. Sea war conditions at Michel's time were much worse than during Widder’s time, and von Ruckteschell even reinforced his tactics, complementing them with a tiny E-Boat (two torpedoes only). He was forced to leave Michel at Kobe, because of illness, giving command to Günther Gumprich. Total von Ruckteschell performance, considering both Widder and Michel first campaign was the highest of all HK commanders, including Krüder (158.065 tons, 25 ships, after 532 days at sea). He was captured after the war, and judged as a war criminal. He was found guilty of firing too long (around 10 minutes) against a surrendered prize and imprisoned for ten years. Very ill, he died in prison. There are people, not all of them German, who think it was not justice, but revenge.

Theodor Detmers (Kormoran; 22-08-1902 – 04-11-1976) was the youngest and lowest ranked, Korvettenkapitän (Commander) of all the HK commanders. His performance was not outstanding (75.375 tons, 12 ships, 351 days at sea), but his last day afloat was the most glorious of all the HK commanders, if not of any German warship commander in WWII. He was forced to fight an Australian regular warship, the HMAS Sydney (Leander-class light cruiser, sister of Ajax and Achilles, 7.100 tons, 8x6" and 33 knots). His fate, no doubt, must be the same as Pinguin six months before, but the Australian commander (Captain Joseph Burnett) seemed to have not been aware of that fight, because he closed distance to Kormoran to around 1.000 meters. It's obvious that Kormorans disguise was excellent, but the fatal question (all the dialog was by flag, with continuous repetitions justified by the bad English of the supposed Dutch Straat Malaka's skipper; Detmers was superb in the delightful art of wasting time), "give me your secret identification code", forced him to open fire almost at point blank range. The Australian ship suffered a lot of heavy impacts even before the first broadside hit her. The automatic fire of all the 37, 20 and 7-92 millimetres guns and machines guns on board Kormoran was devastating. It killed everybody on the bridge and decks, set the Walrus hydro on fire (it was over the catapult, engine on, but not ready for launching because the catapult was not trained outside the ship) and destroyed all the boats and rafts. Seconds later a torpedo hit Sydney below the forecastle taking out of action A and B turrets. Sydney made four hits on Kormoran with her X and Y turrets, setting her on fire. In an apparent effort to ram Kormoran, Sydney crossed her wake, showing to the Germans her intact starboard side. Again, the automatic arms of Kormoran destroyed everything on Sydney’s starboard superstructure, including all boats and rafts. It's believed it was the reason for Sydney's loss of all hands (645 officers and enlisted sailors). Both ships broke contact, and some minutes later was clear for Detmers thar the fire on his ship was uncontrollable, giving orders to abandon her. Sydney was never seen again. Months later, a damaged raft bearing her name was found thousands of miles away with nobody in it. Both shipwrecks are believed to rest in swallow waters, a few miles off the Abrolhos Islands, on the west coast of Australia. The Kormarans crew (all but around sixty died) was captured and interned in an Australian camp (not very comfortable, Germans said). Nobody placed charges against commander Detmers, regardless high suspicious about possible dirty play against Sydney (even today the controversy is still open). The Australian Government released him and his crew 21 months after the war's end. Some people, not all of them germans, thinks this long internement was a form of revenge. Detmers' health never recovered from the Australian hospitality. Declared unsuitable to do service, he couldn't join the Bundesmarine. For some people, he must be credited for the most extraordinary sea action of the entire WWII.

Life on board was very boring. Dividing numbers of days at sea between prizes the mean time between actions was almost 27 days. For commanders it was important to keep moral high on board. All the raiders were well equipped with movies, libraries, swimming pools and any kind of sports and entertainments (no girls, obviously, but it is said that some crews were more lucky than others). A standard custom was to allow "vacations": as an award for something especially well done, a sailor could enjoy up to two weeks of doing nothing (obviously not on battle stations, or Auf Gefechtsstation!).

Regular attitude of these sailors toward the enemy ship wreckers was usually friendly. There were very few claims of brutality, or cruelty (most against the two von Ruckteschell commanded ships). Lives on board with “guests” were usually relaxed, obviously not during action. The ships were not very comfortable, for crew or for prisoners, but the decks were wide and everybody had time to walk around (not under action conditions, of course). Attitude of supply ships (prison ships) not always was equally friendly (their crews were less numerous, and their commanders, not always gentlemen as most of the raiders were, always they were worried with a possible moutin on board, allowing much less facilities for walking, physical exercise and rest space).

A special part of the raider's crews was the "prize group". Each corsair carried a number of officers and sailors to man prize ships. A task rather tricky, because they always needed the "cooperation" of at least a part of the seized crew. The task of this crew was to reach Bordeaux crossing undetected by British naval forces and according to specific timing, in order to avoid being torpedoed by a German U-Boats. In one case (the big Pinguin harvested, 15 ships in a row) the corsair prize crews were unable to man all the ships. Fortunately for the Germans, the Panzerschiff Admiral Scheer was close enough to allow some rooky ensigns or Leutnants zur See (all but two succeeded in reaching Bordeaux).

Other very special parts of the Hilfskreuzer crews were the "disguising party". Every time an aircraft came near, or a suspicious ship crossed in the vicinity, or an enemy warship appeared on the horizon, the "disguising party" appeared on the decks. They were women (simulated, but very well, even if almost naked), black coloured people (again simulated; at this time it was difficult to imagine a freighter's deck without a big, really big, coloured cook), and miscellaneous people (always a protestant priest sitting on deck, plus two or three big ladies near him, and some children playing games. Of course, all of them fully simulated). It is believed that these disguising techniques saved the raiders' lives many times. At least in one case this very efficient disguise was able to cheat an Australian light cruiser to the point of it coming as close as 1.000 meters to a raider (Kormoran), but it did not always work well. The loss of Pinguin, as it was later reported, was because the Cornwall's sea plane pilot inspected her closely from the air was very close to confirm that the suspicious ship was really the Norwegian Tamerlane. He almost did it, but he change his judge after observing that nobody was waving their hands to him from the deck, the bridge or the cooking room. Just by this (the British claimed) the Pinguin was lost.

Crew losses in HK's were comparatively low (considering the ones of U-Boats). Michel and Pinguin being the only exceptions (more deaths than survivors) the crews of the Hilfskreuzers that didn't return to Germany were rather luckier when their ships (Stier, Komet, Kormoran, Atlantis) went down.

The "dirty play" theory said that Detmers (Kormoran's captain) surrendered his ship to the Australians, stopped the engines and waited until the Sydney occupied the usual "safe" position around 135 degrees astern the raider, starboard side, at a distance of 1.000 meters. Then still under the white flag, he ordered a torpedo launch with a secret torpedo tube below the waterline, oriented precisely 135 degrees astern. After the torpedo hit on Sydney, the raider opened gunfire, destroying the Australian cruiser but not before She hit Kormoran several times setting her on fire. According to this theory, Captain Burnett had no way to know the raider had under-waterline tubes, being this was a secret feature of some German raiders. Reinforcing this theory, the fact than the German commander situated the battle 150 miles to the northwest of the actual battle site, trying to avoid that any rescuing action could find survivors alive and able to explain the real facts.

It has been realised that Kormoran had two of these torpedo tubes, one aimed to port and the other to starboard, but also it has been realised that both could only fire a torpedo at speed less than three knots (better at no speed). All the questioned German survivors were in agreement on this: the Kormoran never reduced her speed, estimated at 14-15 knots. This obviously is incompatible with the "dirty play" theory. During the war the Royal Australian Navy declined to present charges against Commander Detmers, releasing him and his crew early in 1947. Some years later, and after some "reflowerishing" of the "dirty play" theory, the Australian Government, after a deep researching effort, declared that there wasn't any evidence against Commander Detmers, giving Captain Burnett the total responsibility for the loss of HMAS Sydney and her total crew of 645 officers and enlisted men. Indifferent to this, still in 2001 some people ask to reopen the case asking for a dive to the wrecks of both ships (localized in moderately shallow waters, some miles off Abrolhos Island), to look for physical evidences. At least today (March 2003) there are on the internet two well detailed websites defending this theory.

Also it has been realised that Commander Detmers didn't tell the truth about the battle position, as this was normal procedure for any German and non-German commander in WWII. They never revealed anything that would put in danger the security of other ships. To give details about the battle could affect the security of the raiders and blockade runners, and because of that Detmers never gave details, at least in war time, about this action and any other action during the Kormoran campaign campaign (after war he and J. Brennecke wrotes a book, Hilfskreuzer Kormoran –The Raider Kormoran-, where he explain his view of the battle with all details).

Without wanting to give opinions in favour of or against Detmer's actions or the "dirty play" theory there are some facts that must be considered, which are as follows:

• Six months before HMS Cornwall sunk HK Pinguin after a short battle at 5.000 meters. British captains learned then that being too close to any German raider (in the range of her 150 mm (5-9") guns) was very dangerous.

• Regardless what has been said that HMAS Sydney could not use her radio it has recently been found out that there was some communication between her and several radio stations, one of them the Singapore one, supposedly giving details about the battle. The content of these communications never has been published.

• Only three days after the battle, HMS Devonshire sunk HK Atlantis firing against her from more than 10.000 meters, keeping herself all the time out the range of the raider's main guns, and leaving the area at full speed after Atlantis sinking, without worrying about shipwreackers, regardless some of them could be british. It was an attitude absolutely different of the Sydney's one.

Given that, why did Captain Burnett put himself at 1.000 meters of a suspicious ship?

Regardless of if the HK's had undersea torpedo tubes or not, it is expected that an experienced captain figures out all the possible armaments of an unknown, non regular enemy warship? (HMAS Sydney was not an inexperienced cruiser a few months before her sinking she sank the Italian light cruiser Bartollomeo Colleoni in the Mediterranean Sea).

Why HMAS Sydney did cross the Kormoran's wake (on fire at the time), showing her undamaged starboard side? (This not understandable action cost the total loss of all crewmembers).

Can the wreck of both ships bring any light to these and other questions?

The answer to the last question is "maybe". It could be possible to verify the not verified torpedo hit at HMAS Sydney's forecastle, port side, and also the declining angle of impact. It would also be possible to verify any possible massive internal explosion inside her, and the status of her superstructures, according to Germans totally destroyed by point blank light calibre gunfire. It also could facilitate an analysis of the undersea Kormoran's tubes, to verify her capacity to fire at speed. Many possible things, but to do this a professional team would have to reach both wrecks, and this costs money. Too much money to solve, or just try to solve, a more than 60 years old mystery.

HK's surviving commanders were very respected and decorated after their campaigns and also afterwards. They deserved it. They were the most successful surface German commanders of the entire war, with the only possible exception of Admiral Marschall (truly prussian thinking, extremely aggressive, never defeated, more enemy warships sunk than any other german flag officer).

A logical speculation about HK's has been their time, their number and their quality. What would have happened if they had started to sail in September of 1939 instead of April 1940? What would have happened if the first wave was of 25 ships instead of just 5? What would have happened if instead of being improvised, not well armed ships, they had been specially built, high buoyancy, some armour, modern gunnery, much faster ships? In the hands of somebody like Helmuth von Ruckteschell, what could be expected from a true light cruiser, diesel engines a speed of 30 knots, disguised as an ugly, slower, unglamorous dirty freighter?

It was clear to the Kriegsmarines high command at the time of the naval treaty with Great Britain, that an open sea war was not possible. Only a commerce war would be feasible. Why spend such a huge amount of money on the Bismarck Class, H Class and Admiral Hipper Class vessels? Why not put it into a true raider line of ships, to be built in quantity, able to face any light cruiser and able to outrun any heavy one, able to stay at sea for years? Able in short to, complement the U-Boats, win the sea commerce war and at the cost of one and a half Bismarck’s?

Again, the same answer. Unglamorous ships were not to the taste of the Nazi thinkers. At least seven German WWII large ships were spectacular in several aspects, the main being one of aesthetics. In some way, they were like the Ludwig II von Bayern castles: beautiful to see, good for nothing. The beauty of Tirpitz is the beauty of Neuschwanstein. Her practical capacity of service was also the same as Neuschwanstein: just good for improving the view. The ships were built more for prestige and image than for battle. They were in their respective categories, the most beautiful warships of their time, but probably not as good as practical sea fighters. They were more propaganda instruments than true men of war. Today it's easy to see, and easy to say. At the time they were built, obviously not. Some long distant, true Prussian strategic officers saw it, and also saw that a special purpose, true raiding warships would be much better for Germany that those big, magnificent, almost useless beauties, but they kept their thoughts well to themselves. To think freely, the very first characteristic of any Clausewitzian officer was totally incompatible with the Nazi system. As Albert Einstein said, "to be an irreproachable member of a flock of sheep it is mandatory, first of all, to be a sheep".